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Summary
Europe's panicked response to the refugee and migration crisis is crushing Greece between two brutal
realities: the closure by the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” of its border with Greece and the
imposition of the EU–Turkey Agreement on the Aegean islands. Greece has been left bearing a grotesquely
disproportionate burden simply because of its place on the map; yet in every other respect, it is perhaps the
least well-placed of all European Union countries to bear this responsibility, with a dysfunctional asylum
system and facing enormous challenges also in other areas.
Much of the responsibility falls to the European Union, which has nevertheless until now failed to provide
adequate support to Greece or to ensure that responsibility is shared equally amongst its member States.
The first victims are the refugees and migrants who find themselves blocked in a country that is unable to
ensure even basic levels of protection, depriving tens of thousands of people of their fundamental human
dignity. There is little sign of these problems being solved.
The Parliamentary Assembly should therefore call on the Greek authorities, the European Union and its
member States, and other States participating in the European Union's relocation scheme to take steps to
ensure respect for the fundamental rights of refugees and migrants and support for the Greek authorities and
society, and to reinforce solidarity between European countries in response to what must be seen as a
European and not only a Greek problem.
1. Reference to committee: Doc. 13975, Reference 4197 of 22 April 2016.
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A. Draft resolution2
1. Europe’s panicked response to the refugee and migration crisis is crushing Greece between two brutal
realities: the closure by “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” of its border with Greece and the
imposition of the European Union–Turkey Agreement (EU–Turkey Agreement) in the Aegean islands. This
has blocked 46 000 refugees and migrants in mainland Greece and a further 8 500 on the islands. Greece
has been left bearing a grotesquely disproportionate burden simply because of its place on the map; yet in
every other respect it is perhaps the least well-placed of all European Union countries to bear this
responsibility.
2. The Greek asylum system has long suffered from a series of failings, found by the European Court of
Human Rights in 2011 to give rise to violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5).
Despite the efforts of the Greek authorities and progress in some areas, the underlying structural problems
remain largely unresolved today, at a time when the asylum system is being placed under greater strain than
ever and the government is confronted by enormous political, administrative and budgetary challenges also in
other areas.
3. Much of the responsibility for the current situation falls to the European Union, which has tacitly
supported the closure of borders along the western Balkans route and concluded the 16 March Agreement
with Turkey. The European Union has nevertheless until now failed to provide adequate support to Greece or
ensure that responsibility is shared equitably amongst its member States. In particular, European Union
member States have collectively failed to satisfy the requests for seconded staff to ensure that the Greek
asylum system can operate effectively, especially on the Aegean islands where most asylum seekers are
detained; and they have collectively failed to respond in any meaningful way to the 2015 agreements on
relocation of recognised refugees. Whilst financial support has been forthcoming, money alone will solve
nothing without the administrative capability and structural capacity in Greece to spend it effectively.
4. The refugee and migrant crisis in the eastern Mediterranean must be fully accepted as a European and
global problem and not only a Greek one. The only effective response will be based on respect for the human
rights of refugees and migrants, in accordance with the fundamental values common to the Council of Europe,
the European Union and their member States, and on genuine solidarity and the practical sharing of
responsibility. There must be grave doubts as to whether the current situation is sustainable, however, with
over 10 000 refugees and migrants still at the northern border, the situation on the Aegean islands continuing
to deteriorate since the EU–Turkey Agreement, and the asylum system on the mainland remaining
dysfunctional.
5. The first victims of the situation in Greece are the refugees and migrants. The Parliamentary Assembly
is particularly concerned by the following aspects:
5.1. on the Aegean islands, asylum seekers who have been convicted of no crime are detained in
the “hotspots” on dubious legal grounds, in conditions that fall below the standards expected of prisons,
in administrative limbo with little information on their situation and complete uncertainty as to their
future;
5.2. vulnerable persons, including women and children, are held in the hotspots alongside angry,
frustrated young adults, exposed to risks of violence, exploitation and abuse;
5.3. asylum seekers on the Aegean islands are at risk of return to Turkey under the EU–Turkey
Agreement of 18 March 2016, despite the fact that such returns appear incompatible with European
Union and international law;
5.4. conditions in most of the reception facilities on the mainland, many of which are entirely unsuited
to such use, fall far below acceptable standards in such basic areas as overcrowding, shelter, food,
sanitation and medical care. Again, many children are forced to endure these conditions;
5.5. thousands of others, again including children, live in informal camps in conditions even more
squalid and hazardous than those in the reception centres;
5.6. refugees and migrants are too often detained as, despite policy reforms, the authorities still fail
to assess and review the individual necessity and proportionality of detention or to apply alternatives
systematically. Conditions in immigration detention centres also remain seriously substandard;
2. Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 3 June 2016.
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5.7. the rights and interests of unaccompanied and separated children are not effectively protected
due to problems with the age assessment system, the guardianship system, appropriate
accommodation capacity and provision of information. Many unaccompanied and separated children
are detained, purportedly for their own protection, in degrading conditions in police stations clearly
unsuited to the purpose;
5.8. it is still far from clear whether the recent extensive reforms of the asylum system will ensure that
previously lacking fundamental procedural guarantees are provided when determining asylum
applications.
6. The Assembly therefore calls on the Greek authorities to:
6.1. ensure that detention conditions in the hotspots meet international standards, implementing any
technical recommendations that may be made by the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) in its preliminary observations
following its April 2016 visit;
6.2. apply and regularly review the grounds for detention in the hotspots, ensuring their strict
compliance with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, and screen all current
detainees and new arrivals to ensure that vulnerable persons are accommodated in appropriate
facilities;
6.3. promptly release those whose continued detention in the hotspots can no longer be justified;
6.4. ensure that there is sufficient open reception capacity, of appropriate type and quality, available
for all non-detained asylum seekers on the islands;
6.5. ensure that the inadmissibility procedure for asylum applications by persons arriving from Turkey
is applied in strict compliance with European Union and international law;
6.6. ensure provision on the mainland of sufficient reception places of appropriate type and quality
for all asylum seekers, including all those currently occupying informal camps;
6.7. only detain migrants and especially asylum seekers when strictly necessary and proportionate,
and ensure that immigration detention conditions meet international standards, implementing fully the
March 2016 report of the CPT;
6.8. guarantee the rights and interests of unaccompanied and separated children, including by
ensuring that the age assessment procedure is properly applied in all contexts, reinforcing the
guardianship system with the creation of a support mechanism for prosecutors, providing sufficient,
appropriate accommodation places, avoiding all recourse to detention of these children, and providing
them with information and advice on their situation and rights;
6.9. ensure that the reformed asylum system is promptly made fully operational, that the backlog of
applications and appeals is rapidly cleared and that new applications are swiftly processed, in full
compliance with European Union standards and those of the European Convention on Human Rights.
7. The Assembly also calls on the European Union, its member States and States participating in the
relocation scheme, as appropriate, to:
7.1. respond promptly and fully to the calls for seconded national staff to support the Greek asylum
service;
7.2. implement promptly and fully the September 2015 agreements on relocation from Greece;
7.3. be prepared for the possibility of the failure of the current approach with alternative solutions
ready in advance, avoiding the pattern of unpreparedness and reflexive crisis management apparent
until now.
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B. Explanatory memorandum by Ms Tineke Strik, rapporteur
1. Introduction
1. Europe’s panicked response to the eastern Mediterranean/ western Balkans refugee and migration
crisis is crushing Greece between two brutal realities: the closure of its northern border with “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and the imposition of the European Union–Turkey Agreement (EU–Turkey
Agreement) at its eastern maritime border with Turkey. A country still in the depths of an economic depression
that has lasted since 2008, subject to punishing, externally-imposed austerity measures, has thus since March
been saddled by the European Union with an immense responsibility – to care for the tens of thousands of
refugees, asylum seekers and migrants who are now blocked in Greece, but whose real hope was to reach
the other richer countries of Europe. It is a reflection of the refugees’ and migrants’ intentions that the vast
majority of the one million-plus refugees and migrants who have arrived in Greece by sea since the beginning
of 2015 did not remain in the country.
2. Nevertheless, as a result of the co-ordinated closure of borders along the western Balkans route, there
are now 46 000 refugees and migrants blocked in mainland Greece and a further 8 500 on the islands. Those
on the mainland who qualify for international protection will be forced to stay in Greece, whose reception and
integration capacity remains seriously insufficient, until relocated to another country participating in the
European Union’s relocation scheme – or until they find a clandestine way to continue their journey north,
most probably in the hands of migrant smugglers. Those on the islands are for the most part detained in
inadequate conditions, and in all cases subject to the vagaries of the dysfunctional Greek asylum system for
assessment of whether or not they will be returned to Turkey. In 2016, 89% of arrivals were from Syria,
Afghanistan or Iraq.
3. In April 2016, the Parliamentary Assembly expressed its concern at the situation in Greece when
adopting resolutions on the situation in the western Balkans and on the EU–Turkey Agreement.3 The present
report is intended to focus specifically on the overall situation of refugees and migrants in Greece: from the
Aegean islands where new arrivals are halted and their applications processed in newly-created facilities
under new, accelerated procedures; to Athens and the mainland, where the Greek authorities and others are
struggling to provide sufficient reception capacity and to implement a whole new asylum system; to the border
with “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, where over 10 000 refugees and migrants remain in the
desperate hope of being allowed to continue north.4
2. The failings of the Greek asylum system: an old problem
4. In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) issued a judgment against Belgium and
Greece concerning the treatment of an Afghan asylum seeker who had entered the European Union via
Greece, travelled to Belgium, where he claimed asylum, and was returned under the Dublin Regulation to
Greece, where he renewed his claim for asylum.5 The Court found a series of violations of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”) relating to the applicant’s treatment in Greece:
– when returned from Belgium, he had immediately been placed in detention without explanation, in poor
conditions, and was subjected to brutality and insults at the hands of the police officers. Taken together,
the Court found that such circumstances constituted degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention, accentuated by his vulnerability as an asylum seeker;
– following his release from detention, the applicant had lived for months in the most abject poverty, with
no food and nowhere to live or to wash, in constant fear of being attacked and robbed, and with no
prospect of his situation improving. These conditions, for which the Greek authorities were responsible,
were sufficiently severe to amount to a violation of Article 3;
– a series of deficiencies in the Greek authorities’ examination of the applicant’s asylum application,
including excessively short deadlines, insufficient capacity within the asylum system, failures to proceed
with examination of the application, to maintain contact and to provide information, unavailability of legal
assistance and procedural delays before the Supreme Court, along with the risk he faced of being
3. Resolution 2108 (2016) “Human rights of refugees and migrants – The situation in the western Balkans”, and
Resolution 2109 (2016) on the situation of refugees and migrants under the EU–Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016.
4. See the motion for a resolution on “Refugees at risk in Greece’, Doc. 13975.
5. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, judgment of 21 January 2011 (Grand Chamber).
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returned directly or indirectly to his country of origin without any serious examination of the merits of his
application, amounted to a violation of his right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the
Convention.
5. In the same judgment, the Court also found that Belgium had violated Article 3 of the Convention by
returning the applicant to Greece in circumstances where it should have known that detention and reception
conditions, and the risk of onward refoulement to Afghanistan, would themselves amount to violations of
Article 3. As a result, transfers of asylum seekers to Greece under the Dublin system were effectively
suspended.
6. The same year, the Court issued judgment in a case concerning treatment by the Greek authorities of
an unaccompanied minor Afghan asylum seeker, who on arrival in Lesvos, Greece, had initially been detained
pending deportation, then placed under the guardianship of a person whom the authorities took to be his
cousin, and once released from detention, left to fend for himself.6 The Court found a series of violations
relating to the authorities’ decision to detain without consideration of alternative measures, the decision to
appoint the presumed cousin (with whom the applicant almost immediately lost contact) as his guardian, and
serious legal and practical shortcomings in the remedy against detention pending removal, all aggravated by
the applicant’s vulnerability as an unaccompanied minor.
7. The Committee of Ministers continues to supervise the execution by Greece of both of these
judgments,7 a clear indication that the authorities have yet to resolve the structural problems underlying the
various violations. A persistent cause of both these structural problems and the delay in addressing them has
been the administrative inefficiency of the Greek State. One of the reasons given by the Greek authorities in
October 2015 for their failure to put in place an expected number of reception places was the restructuring of
the entire immigration policy.8 The fact that an entirely new asylum law (No. 4375/2016, adopted in order to
allow implementation of the EU–Turkey Agreement) was adopted in early April may well add to the confusion
and generate further delays in achieving the practical results required by the Court’s judgments (see further
below).
8. In recent months, the European Union has nevertheless repeatedly raised the possibility of resuming
Dublin transfers to Greece,9 despite the fact that the authorities have still clearly not made sufficient progress
in addressing issues concerning especially reception capacity and the protection of unaccompanied minors,
issues that have been aggravated by the current crisis.
3. Closure of the border with “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”: the cul de sac
9. On 9 March 2016, countries along the western Balkans route from “the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia” northwards closed their borders to refugees and migrants hoping to transit the country.10
Although some countries declared that they would continue to admit certain persons, for example those with
Schengen visas or intending to submit asylum applications in that country, the authorities of “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” took a categorical approach, with the police announcing that the border was
“completely” closed. Indeed, the country’s interior ministry has reported zero new arrivals since 9 March.11 As
a result, with few exceptions, every refugee or migrant who has crossed the Aegean from Turkey to the Greek
islands since then has remained in Greece. It should be recalled that the decisions to close borders were
clearly co-ordinated between the States involved but that Greece, although directly concerned, was neither
consulted nor informed in advance.
10. At the border itself, the Macedonian police have enforced border control by force, most notoriously in
early May, when tear gas, rubber bullets and batons were used to force refugees and migrants back from the
razor-wire fence. Eidomeni, on the border, has become infamous worldwide as a place of misery. By mid-
6. Rahimi v. Greece, Application No. 8687/08, judgment of 5 April 2011.
7. Most recently at its “human rights” (CM/DH) meeting in December 2015. The next examination is scheduled for
December 2016.
8. Document DH-DD(2015)1134, “Communication from the authorities concerning the M.S.S. and Rahimi groups of
cases against Greece”, 29 October 2015.
9. See, for example, “Back to Schengen – A Roadmap”, European Commission, COM(2016)120 final, 4 March 2016.
10. For further details of the implementation of progressively more restrictive border controls during previous weeks, see
the Assembly report on “Human rights of refugees and migrants – the situation in the Western Balkans”, Doc. 14013,
4 April 2016 (covering the situation up to mid-March).
11. There have continued to be arrivals reported in Serbia, Hungary and Austria; presumably these either entered via a
country other than “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, most likely Bulgaria, or crossed it without coming to the
attention of the authorities, possibly using the services of migrant smugglers.
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May, there were over 9 400 people at Eidomeni, and over 1 000 more at the nearby EKO gas station, living in
lawless squalor in informal tented encampments, desperately hoping that the border would reopen.12 Some
4 000 children,13 many of them unaccompanied minors hoping to join relatives in other European countries,
are amongst the camps’ inhabitants, exposed to violence, abuse and exploitation.14 The Greek authorities
have for some time expressed the intention of closing the informal camps and moving their occupants to
shelter elsewhere in Greece, but have so far failed to do so.
11. Another consequence of the closure of the borders is an increase in migrant smuggling. Indeed, when I
visited the western Balkans in November 2015, the authorities themselves told me that one of the advantages
of the policy then in place of allowing entry and transit was that refugees and migrants were not forced into the
hands of migrant smugglers. It is not surprising, therefore, that migrant smugglers are indeed now widely
active in the informal camps at Eidomeni.15
4. The EU–Turkey Agreement: administrative limbo and uncertainty in the Aegean
12. At the opposite end of Greece, refugees and migrants continue to arrive on the Aegean islands,
although in much smaller numbers than before the EU–Turkey Agreement took effect on 20 March – on
average, under 170 per day (and only 32 from 10 to 16 May), as opposed to over 3 250 between 1 October
2015 and 19 March 2016. Despite the fact that all refugees and migrants who had arrived on the islands
before 20 March were transferred to the mainland, there are now over 8 500 on the islands, which have
capacity (in detention and reception facilities) for only 7 450.
13. Five of the islands – Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos – have “hotspots”, or “reception and
identification centres” as they are known under Greek law. The hotspots are now all closed facilities, in effect
detention centres for the majority of asylum seekers on the islands. Despite the February 2015 reforms to
Greece’s immigration detention policy and the provisions of Law 4375/2016 whereby vulnerable persons
should be excluded from the detained procedure, it has been reported that on Lesvos, for example, new
arrivals are not systematically screened for vulnerability, such that “people with serious health problems,
single parents alone with large numbers of small children, women and men at risk of sexual and gender based
violence and other vulnerable groups frequently went unnoticed and left without the specialised care they may
be in need of… There were neither guidelines to identify them nor standard operating procedures on what to
do once identified available to the Frontex guest officers and Greek police officers”.16 Overall, hundreds of
children have been detained in the hotspots in inappropriate, poor conditions, at risk of abuse.17
14. Similarly, there is no indication that detention conditions in the hotspots have improved since the
Assembly adopted Resolution 2109 (2016). Indeed, since then, the number of refugees and migrants on the
islands has increased from just under 7 900 to 8 500, with no increase in capacity.
– There are currently over 4 200 refugees and migrants on Lesvos, which has capacity for 3 500. More
than 3 000 are detained in the Moria hotspot. A further 800-1 000 are in the open camp at Kara Tepe,
which is run by the local authority. Others, especially vulnerable persons, are in the Pipka Lesvos open
facility run by volunteers, although it is reported to be under threat of closure.
– There are currently over 2 270 refugees and migrants on Chios, which has capacity for 1 100. Over
1 000 are detained in the VIAL hotspot. Around 1 000 more are in the open camp at Souda. There are
also other open facilities at Dipethe and Tabakika, somewhat improvised in order to receive the
overflow from VIAL and Souda.
– There are currently over 1 000 refugees and migrants on Samos, which has capacity for 850; 522 on
Leros, which has capacity for 1 000; and 351 on Kos, which has capacity for 1 000.18
12. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Daily map indicating capacity and
occupancy (Governmental figures)”, 17 M ay 2016.
13. United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), “Regional Humanitarian Situation Report #11”, 4 May 2016.
14. See, for example, “The refugee children of Idomeni: alone, far from home but clinging to hope”, The Guardian, 8 May
2016.
15. See, for example, “Idomeni: Europe’s first favela”, Deutsche Welle, 8 April 2016; “Smugglers Prey on Migrants
Desperate to Find Back Doors to Europe”, New York Times, 11 March 2016.
16. “Trapped in Greece: An avoidable refugee crisis”, Amnesty International, April 2016 (hereafter “Amnesty – Trapped in
Greece”).
17. See, for example, “Conditions rapidly deteriorating for children detained in Moria camp on Lesvos”, Save the
Children, 3 April 2016, “An estimated 75% of child refugees stranded alone in Greece do not have safe place to stay,
warns Save the Children”, 16 April 2016.
18. “Daily map indicating capacity and occupancy (Governmental figures)”, UNHCR, 17 May 2016.
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15. Detention conditions have led to unrest in the hotspots: after the 21 April mass breakout from the VIAL
hotspot on Chios, there was a further outbreak of violent protest in Moria, Lesvos on 27 April, with riot police
entering the camp to restore order, using tear gas and injuring several detainees. This outbreak was
apparently provoked by claims that a detained child had been beaten by police.19 A further indication of
conditions in the hotspots can be seen in the numerous online videos showing maggot-infested food given to
detainees.20 In April, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) visited the hotspots, following which it announced that it would shortly submit
its preliminary observations to the Greek authorities in writing.21 I look forward to publication of these
observations and urge the Greek authorities to implement any technical recommendations promptly and in
full.
16. As noted in Assembly Resolution 2109 (2016) on the situation of refugees and migrants under the EU–
Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016, “detention of asylum seekers in the ‘hotspots’ on the Aegean islands
may be incompatible with the requirements of the [Convention], due notably to procedural failures
undermining the legal grounds for detention and inadequate detention conditions”. The legal concerns have
only been exacerbated by the passage of time, as whether detaining a person whilst examining their asylum
application (the case for most detainees) or pending their removal, the authorities are required to act with due
expedition, otherwise detention becomes incompatible with the Convention. It should be noted, however, that
some 1 100 people are reported to have been released from detention following expiration of the 25-day limit
under Greek law. It is unclear whether this includes all of those who have reached the time-limit. Those
released remain confined to the islands, even though there is inadequate alternative accommodation capacity,
and the UNHCR has recognised their resulting vulnerability to traffickers.22
17. Despite the fact that the EU–Turkey Agreement has now been in force for more than a month, that the
great majority of detainees have claimed asylum and that many of them have been in detention for weeks, the
Greek asylum system is still far from operational in the hotspots. This is at least partly due to the European
Union’s failure to provide the promised support. On 19 March, EASO had called for other EU member States
to contribute 400 asylum officers and 400 interpreters, and on 4 April had called for a further 72 asylum
officers. By 4 May, only 63 asylum officers and 67 interpreters had actually been deployed, and the extent to
which they were operational in their new surroundings was unclear: the European Commission estimated that
the asylum system on the Greek islands “has the capacity to conduct around 50 interviews per day”. 23 This
would imply that the 25-day detention deadline would expire before the asylum procedure had been
completed for almost everyone currently in detention, and that they would then have to be released even if no
alternative accommodation was available. One should also recall that capacity does not necessarily equal
actual productivity; and note that the Commission does not indicate how many decisions are being issued
following those interviews, how many appeals against refusal are being heard or whether procedural
deadlines are being respected. The situation is perhaps well illustrated by the fact that one group of refugees
even attempted to swim from Chios back to Turkey, having given up hope that their cases would be
examined.24
18. The shortcomings of the Greek asylum system, especially on the islands, risk being acutely exposed
when applying the provision of the new Law 4375/2016 allowing return of asylum seekers to Turkey as a “safe
third country” or “first country of asylum”. Assembly Resolution 2109 (2016) found, on legal grounds that
remain valid, that returns of asylum seekers of any nationality to Turkey as a “safe third country” are contrary
to European Union and/or international law, and that returns of Syrian asylum seekers to Turkey as a “first
country of asylum” may be contrary to European Union and/or international law. Since then, it has been
reported that Syrians sent back to Turkey, including a pregnant woman, have been detained for weeks in a
remote camp, without access to lawyers or specialised medical care, and that those returned “face arbitrary
detention, an inscrutable asylum process, and substandard living conditions”.25 This only reinforces the
Assembly’s concerns about the possible fate of asylum seekers returned to Turkey, further undermining the
lawfulness of such returns. In this respect, one should note that despite efforts by the European Commission
to persuade the Greek authorities that EU law requirements for returns to Turkey are satisfied,26 a Greek
19. See, for example, “Police deploy tear gas as refugees chanting ‘freedom’ spark riot in Lesbos migrant camp after
rumours an officer had struck a child”, Daily Mail, 27 April 2016.
20. See, for example, “The Chios Hilton: inside the refugee camp that makes prison look like a five-star hotel”, The
Independent, 22 April 2016.
21. “Council of Europe anti-torture Committee visits ‘hotspots’ in Greece”, 20 April 2016.
22. “Migrants freed from Greek detention, trapped in limbo on islands”, Reuters, 9 May 2016.
23. “Implementing the EY-Turkey Agreement – Questions and Answers”, European Commission, 4 May 2016.
24. “Desperate to Leave Greece Refugees Try to Swim Back to Turkey”, Greek Reporter, 10 May 2016.
25. “Syrians returned to Turkey under EU deal ‘have had no access to lawyers’”, The Guardian, 16 May 2016.
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asylum appeals committee on Lesvos has found that the temporary protection that would be available in
Turkey to one Syrian appellant did not offer rights equivalent to those guaranteed by the 1951 United Nations
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.27
19. Although the EU–Turkey Agreement has led to a reduction – although far from a complete cessation –
of arrivals from Turkey, so far none of the 8 600 who arrived after 20 March has been returned.28 386 people
who arrived before 20 March have been returned: the European Commission claims that these are “irregular
migrants not in need of international protection”, but other sources report that they included Afghans, Iranians
and Palestinians who had been unable to access the asylum system in Greece before being returned.29
20. Given the inability of the Greek authorities and the European Union to put in place adequate reception
and accommodation facilities or a functioning asylum system on the islands, the fact that more people
continue to arrive than to leave will only make an already appalling situation even worse.
5. The situation on the mainland: crisis management by a broken system
5.1. The asylum system
21. Greece has long struggled with a defective asylum system. Many fundamental problems persist,
including inadequate provision of information to asylum seekers; persistent obstacles to accessing the asylum
procedure; long delays in the asylum procedure, including a persistent backlog of applications; the capacity of
the asylum service, including failure to open planned regional offices and under-staffing; persistent delays in
clearing the backlog of appeals under previous procedures; and the structure and rules of procedure of the
Appeals Authority and its Appeals Committees.30
22. In order to create a basis in domestic law for implementation of the EU–Turkey Agreement – in
particular, accelerated asylum procedures for detained applicants and returns to Turkey – the Greek
Parliament adopted Law 4375/2016 under urgent procedure on 1 April 2016. The new law, which for the most
part entered into force on 4 April, contains provisions on institutional matters, including establishment of an
Asylum Service and a Reception and Identification Service within the Ministry of the Interior and
Administrative Reconstruction, and of an autonomous Appeals Authority within the Ministry, directly
dependent on the Minister. Other significant reforms include the following:
– 7 800 of the 18 500 persons with pending asylum applications will automatically be eligible for a
residence permit on humanitarian grounds;
– further transposition of relevant EU directives into Greek law, relating inter alia to:
- provision of free legal aid for hearings before the Appeals Authority, as required under the
Asylum Procedures Directive;
- aligning possible grounds for detention with the Reception Conditions Directive;
- revising domestic implementation of the concepts of “first country of asylum” and “safe third
country” in the inadmissibility procedure (necessary for returns to Turkey);
- revising the accelerated border procedure, allowing its application also in hotspots;
26. See the letter from Mr Matthias Ruete, Director General, Directorate-General, Migration and Home Affairs, European
Commission, to Mr Vasileios Papadopoulos, Secretary-General, General Secretariat for Population and Social Cohesion,
5 May 2016; also “Next Operational Steps in EU–Turkey Cooperation in the Field of Migration”, Communication from the
European Commission, COM(2016)166 final, 16 March 2016.
27. See, for example, “Migrant deal at risk as Turkey deemed unsafe by Greek court”, Ekathimerini, 20 May 2016; the
same article notes that the Lesvos appeals committee has granted asylum in 100 of the 174 applications by Syrians that it
has so far examined. It has also been reported that the Greek authorities have rejected only about 30% of claims
processed so far in the hotspots: see “Greece Struggles to Return Migrants Under EU–Turkey Deal”, Wall Street Journal,
19 May 2016.
28. One of the main provisions of the EU–Turkey Agreement is that all those arriving after 20 March and found not to be
in need of international protection will be returned to Turkey. For further details, see the Assembly’s report, Doc. 14028.
29. See, for example, “What Merkel, Tusk and Timmermans should have seen during their visit to Turkey”, Report from
GUE/NGL Delegation to Turkey, May 2016; “EU/Greece: First Turkey Deportations Riddled With Abuse”, Human Rights
Watch, 19 April 2016; “Turkey ‘Safe Country’ Sham Revealed as Dozens of Afghans Forcibly Returned Hours after
European Union Refugee Deal”, Amnesty International, 23 March 2016.
30. “Greece as a Country of Asylum – UNHCR’s Recommendations”, 6 April 2015 (hereafter “Greece – UNHCR’s
Recommendations”); “5th Joint Submission of the ICJ and ECRE to the Committee of Ministers in the case of M.S.S. v.
Belgium and Greece and related cases”, March 2016 (hereafter “ICJ and ECRE 5th Joint Submission”).
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- the appeals procedure, with slightly improved time limits but an apparent gap in the provision of
remedies against removal with automatic suspensive effect.31
23. One of the issues underlying the violations found in the M.S.S. judgment was failures by the Greek
asylum system properly to apply Greek law. It is to be hoped that the new Law 4375/2016, which transposes
complex provisions of EU law, including on fundamental issues like detention, asylum procedures and returns,
will be properly applied by the various bodies responsible. It is also to be hoped that adequate resources,
including trained personnel, are made available to allow the new system to function properly. All legal and
administrative reforms necessarily take time and resources to be effective: the new law alone will not resolve
the chronic structural and resource problems.
24. A recent illustration of the asylum system’s weaknesses is the announcement on 14 May that a “pre-
registration exercise for international protection” for those in open facilities on the mainland who had arrived in
Greece before 20 March would “begin in the next few weeks … and take several weeks to conclude”. This
exercise would be “the first step to apply for international protection in Greece” and “could eventually” lead to
examination of an application, or Dublin transfer or relocation to another country. At the end of the exercise,
each individual will be issued with an “asylum seeker card”. This strongly suggests that a significant number of
pre-20 March arrivals have still not even been “pre-registered” and are without documents, and that this
process will only be a very preliminary stage of the asylum procedure. One wonders how and why a
potentially large number of people could have been transferred from the islands to the mainland without such
basic processing having taken place. Furthermore, the vague, even non-committal language suggests that
even the Greek authorities themselves lack confidence in their capacity to complete the process.32
5.2. Reception capacity
25. The Greek army has made considerable efforts to create new reception capacity around the country,
with many new facilities opened in the past three months. Even quantitatively, however, their capacity is
insufficient: 34 650 putative places for 45 985 occupants. This is significantly below the total of 50 000 places
(including 30 000 in reception centres and 20 000 in rent-subsidised accommodation, to be made available in
collaboration with UNHCR) to which Greece committed itself at the Western Balkans Route Leaders’ Meeting
on 25 October 2015. The legal status and actual nature of many supposed reception facilities is unclear, as is
the question of which agency has administrative responsibility for their operation. It has also been claimed that
many places considered by the European Commission to be open accommodation are in fact detention. The
European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) has concluded that “[p]ersons applying for international
protection in Greece therefore run risks of homelessness and destitution”, contrary to Greece’s obligations
under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Court’s judgment in M.S.S.33
26. The quality of reception capacity is also inadequate for longer-term reception. Most of the new facilities
were intended to be temporary (the UNHCR describes them as “emergency reception sites”), and many of the
longer-standing ones were originally intended as transit centres. The Special Representative of the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe on Migration and Refugees, Tomas Bocek, who visited Greece in March,
found, for example, that at Elliniko, a former Olympic Games facility to the south of Athens “1 500 people were
accommodated in overcrowded conditions in a building and tents … Only their basic needs were covered:
food, hygiene products, blankets and sleeping bags … I saw several people sleeping on the floor covered with
blankets. The effects of overcrowding, in terms of hygiene, were palpable. Very few staff were present … It
would appear that the Elliniko camp is clearly inadequate for long-term stays, especially given the number of
persons present there today”. Similarly, he found that conditions at Nea Kavala, north of Thessaloniki, were
also “sub-standard and have to be significantly improved. The Greek authorities need help to ensure that
people do not sleep in tents in the mud and that they do not have to burn plastic waste to keep warm”.34
27. There has been violent protest also in facilities on the mainland. On 10 May, for example, up to a
thousand occupants of Elliniko went on hunger strike in protest at the “subhuman conditions”, including the
quality of the food and the perceived preferential treatment given to Syrians.35
31. See further Assembly Resolution 2109 (2016); also “Greece: Asylum Reform in the Wake of the EU–Turkey Deal”,
Asylum Information Database, 4 April 2016.
32. “Joint press release: The registration of asylum seekers residing in open reception facilities in the mainland will begin
in the next few weeks”, Hellenic Republic Asylum Service/UNHCR/EASO, 14 May 2016.
33. “ICJ and ECRE 5th Joint Submission”.
34. “Report of the fact-finding mission by Ambassador Tomas Bocek, Special Representative of the Secretary General
on migration and refugees, to Greece and ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 7-11 March 2016”, 26 April 2016,
document SG/Inf(2016)18; also, for example, “Amnesty – Trapped in Greece”.
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28. Alongside the official reception centres, there are also several informal camps, notably at Piraeus port
in Athens. Despite the huge decrease, following the EU–Turkey Agreement, in the number of arrivals of
refugees and migrants at the port from the Aegean islands, in mid-May there were still over 1 400 people
camping at Piraeus.36 It was reported that in March, “refugees and migrants, including many families with
small children and babies, pregnant women, people with disabilities and elderly, [were] enduring squalid
reception conditions ... Refugees and migrants were resting and sleeping on the floor of the terminals with
nothing other than a fleece blanket or in small tents inside a cold warehouse and outside the premises at the
mercy of the cold temperatures at night. Facilities were insufficient with four to six showers without hot water
in one of the terminals and only eight to ten chemical toilets per terminal”.37 The government intends to
transfer the occupants by mid-June to an accommodation centre at Skaramangas (established in April and
defined by the UNHCR as an “emergency reception site’).38 Victoria Square in central Athens may no longer
be a significant informal camp but is still used as an unofficial meeting place, and Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF) has set up a clinic nearby. Migrant smugglers are reported to be particularly active in these informal
sites.39
5.3. Detention of asylum seekers
29. In February 2015, the Greek Government reformed the policy on immigration detention, to make
greater use of alternatives, create more open reception facilities, decrease the maximum duration of detention
to six months, gradually release those detained for long periods and immediately release vulnerable persons
and asylum seekers.40 Civil society organisations monitoring detention nevertheless continue to express
concerns, reflected also in the UNHCR’s Recommendations. These relate notably to failure to individually
assess the necessity and proportionality of detention for asylum seekers or to apply alternatives
systematically; detention of persons identified as qualifying for international protection; detention of persons
with serious health problems; over-reliance on certain grounds for detention; apparent failure to review the
necessity and appropriateness of detention orders at regular interviews; and apparent failure to take into
account the existence of appropriate detention facilities and the conditions in available detention facilities
when imposing and reviewing detention orders.41
30. Conditions of immigration detention on the mainland remain inadequate, five years after the M.S.S.
judgment. Although not specifically limited to detention of asylum seekers, one report notes inadequate health
care, lack of support by specialised staff (such as psychologists), inadequate food, inadequate heating,
inadequate provision of recreational or educational activities, inadequate provision of clothes, shoes and
personal hygiene items, lack of information and interpretation services and lack of free legal aid.42 The CPT
has issued a detailed report on appalling conditions in several immigration detention centres, concluding of
one that “conditions of detention remained totally inadequate for holding irregular migrants for prolonged
periods”.43
5.4. Unaccompanied and separated children
31. On 6 April, UNICEF reported that there were over 22 000 refugee and migrant children in Greece,
around 40% of the total refugee and migrant population.44 Around 2 000 of these are unaccompanied and
separated children (UASC) asylum seekers.45 The Greek asylum system remains unable to ensure effective
protection of these children, with many of the problems that were identified five years ago in the Rahimi
judgment still present.
35. “1 000 Refugees on Hunger Strike Against Subhuman Conditions at Elliniko Camp”, Greek Reporter, 10 May 2016;
“Tensions high at Greece’s migrant, refugee camps”, Ekathimerini, 10 May 2016.
36. “Refugees, migrants at Piraeus port reach 1 407”, Ekathimerini, 13 May 2016.
37. “Amnesty – Trapped in Greece”.
38. “Migration Min. Mouzalas: Makeshift Refugee Camp at Piraeus Port Must be Evacuated by Mid-June”, Greek
Reporter, 13 May 2016.
39. “Revealed: Migrants ‘offered €10,000 all-inclusive travel packages’ from Greece into central Europe despite border
closures”, Daily Mail, 20 April 2016.
40. CPT report on its visit to Greece of 14-23 April 2015, document CPT/Inf(2016)4.
41. See, for example, “Monitoring Immigration Detention: Quarterly Report December 2015 – March 2016”, AITIMA,
March 2016; “ICJ and ECRE 5th Joint Submission”; “Greece – UNHCR’s Recommendations”; also CPT/Inf(2016)4.
42. AITIMA, op. cit.
43. Document CPT/Inf(2016)4.
44. “UNICEF urges full hearings for refugee and migrant children stranded in Greece”, 6 April 2016; “New EU–Turkey
agreement on refugee and migrants could leave children at risk: UNICEF”, 22 March 2016.
45. “An estimated 75% of child refugees stranded alone in Greece do not have a safe place to stay, warns Save the
Children”, 16 April 2016.
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32. Problems start already at the stage of age determination. The Special Representative of the Secretary
General reported that “[a]lthough the age-assessment procedure does not seem to be problematic per se,
there are implementation issues … Moreover, there do not seem to be any effective means of appealing
against the outcome of the assessment”.46 Likewise, the NGO AITIMA has reported that “the age assessment
procedure provided for the First Reception Centers is not applied in a large scale, resulting in many minors
being registered inaccurately as adults which has a direct impact on the care they receive”.47
33. The guardianship system also fails to fulfil its role. Public prosecutors are supposed to appoint a
permanent guardian, until which time they are provisionally responsible for ensuring the child’s interests and
welfare. In practice, prosecutors lack the capacity to discharge this crucial function. The UNHCR has
repeatedly called for the creation of a support mechanism for prosecutors in this respect.48
34. There is a desperate shortage of appropriate accommodation for unaccompanied and separated
children. In mid-April, it was estimated that 75% of the 2 000 unaccompanied and separated child asylum
seekers were without a safe place to stay, with only 477 shelter spaces nationwide, all of which had been
occupied for weeks. As a result, new arrivals had nowhere to stay and were either sleeping rough in “volatile”
informal camps or were held for long periods in detention centres and police cells. “This puts vulnerable and
often traumatised children at risk of abuse, exploitation by people traffickers, disease and psychological
stress.”49
35. Across Greece, unaccompanied and separated children are often detained “for their own protection” in
police stations, sometimes for lengthy periods “in conditions akin to solitary confinement”.50 Amnesty
International has reported on six unaccompanied and separated children held under “protective custody” at
Evzoni police station near Eidomeni, in “very poor conditions including lack of natural light, lack of heating and
hot water”, with mouse infestation and a blocked toilet in the detention area giving off an “unbearable odour”;
there was no interpretation available and the police were dependent on NGOs to provide information to the
child detainees.51
36. On account of their age and inexperience, unaccompanied and separated children are in particular
need of assistance with asylum procedures. In addition to the failure of the guardianship system, however,
they are not even provided with necessary information, whether they reside in hotspots, child-friendly shelters
or informal camps. As the Special Representative of the Secretary General has noted, this is a matter of
concern also because these children should be prime beneficiaries of the relocation schemes, yet are
unaware of their rights and the applicable procedures.52
6. Relocation of refugees: no relief from the pressure on Greece
37. In September 2015, the European Union, with the United Kingdom opting out but with Schengen
associates Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland opting in, agreed to relocate a total 50 400 refugees from
Greece by September 2017. Actual relocation depends on various factors, including expressions of interest by
refugees, their willingness to accept the places offered to them, the efficiency and good faith of national
authorities in both Greece and receiving States when administering the process, but above all on the number
of pledges made by receiving States.
38. It has been reported that many refugees who had expressed an interest in relocation have declined
places made available to them, apparently for fear of being permanently separated from their families.53 The
European Commission has noted administrative problems such as States’ incorrect use of preferences,
lengthy response times, obstructive security checks, unjustified rejections and lack of pre-departure
information to refugees (who as a result withdraw from the process).54
46. Document SG/Inf(2016)18.
47. AITIMA, op. cit.
48. “Submission by the UNHCR for the OHCHR’s Compilation Report – Universal Periodic Review: 2nd Cycle, 25th
Session, Greece”, UNHCR, September 2015; “Greece – UNHCR’s Recommendations”.
49. “An estimated 75% of child refugees stranded alone in Greece do not have a safe place to stay, warns Save the
Children”, 16 April 2016.
50. Document CPT/Inf(2016)4.
51. “Amnesty – Trapped in Greece”.
52. Document SG/Inf(2016)18.
53. “Refugees in Greece refuse to relocate across EU”, Financial Times, 16 May 2016.
54. European Commission, “First report on relocation and resettlement”, 16 March 2016, COM(2016)165 final, and
“Second report on relocation and resettlement”, 12 April 2016, COM(2016)222 final.
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39. There are also some arguably irrational aspects to the system, such as the fact that as of mid-March,
persons from Costa Rica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (a group of tiny islands in the Caribbean) and the
Maldives (amongst others, including Syria and Iraq) qualified for relocation, but those from, for example,
Yemen or Afghanistan did not. This is because whether or not a particular nationality qualifies depends on
whether the EU average recognition rate for asylum seekers of that nationality is at least 75%. A further
problem is unpredictability: as recognition rates change over time, so a particular nationality may qualify or
cease to qualify; Yemenis, for example, have ceased to qualify.
40. Nevertheless, the number one reason given by the European Commission for the scheme’s
shortcomings is the “insufficient and limited number of formal pledges”. On 16 March, the Commission, whilst
noting improved responses in early March, stated that “[t]he unsatisfactory level of implementation ... is due to
a variety of factors, including the lack of political will of Member States to deliver in a full and timely manner on
their legal obligations to relocate.” On 12 April, the Commission noted that only a further 46 had been
relocated, and that “relocation efforts were made by only a few … States”.55 By 2 May, only a further 99
refugees had been relocated. The Commission had set an interim target of 20 000 by mid-May;56 by 18 May,
however, only 909 refugees had actually been relocated – less than 5% of the interim target, and less than
2% of the agreed total.57
41. In March, the European Commission recalled that the relocation agreements were “emergency
measures intended to relieve the significant asylum pressure on Greece and Italy. Given that these pressures
are acute, in particular in Greece, the need for stepped-up action becomes all the more compelling”. In April, it
urged States “to increase dramatically their efforts to reply to the urgent humanitarian situation in Greece”. In
May, it argued that “Greece is facing a humanitarian crisis that requires quick and full implementation of the
[relocation decisions]”. The Commission estimates that between 35 000 to 40 000 persons now in Greece
would be eligible for relocation.58 This is a tiny figure compared with the number who arrived via the Western
Balkans route last year. The failure so far to achieve relocation of even 1 000 refugees is frankly shameful and
suggests a cynical, short-sighted attitude on the part of many participating States to the plight of the refugees
and migrants in Greece and to the travails of the Greek people and authorities.
7. EU support to Greece
42. The European Union has promised to provide extensive support to Greece, in the form of both financial
aid and personnel, in order to reform its asylum system, administer the hotspots and deal with the internal
consequences of closure of the northern border. European Commission President Juncker has appointed an
official to co-ordinate this support. As noted above, the actual response to the calls for seconded asylum
officers and interpreters has so fallen far below requirements. This is also the case in other areas: on 19
March, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union (Frontex) called for 1 500 escort officers and 50 return officers; by 4
May, only 292 escort officers and 21 return officers had actually been deployed. Likewise, the European
Asylum Support Office’s (EASO) calls for experts, including for relocation, have consistently not been met by
a satisfactory response.
43. Financial assistance has been more forthcoming: the European Union should finance the estimated
€280 million cost of implementing the EU–Turkey Agreement; €267 million emergency assistance funding has
been earmarked for Greece for 2016, available to both the authorities and international organisations;
€83 million to improve living conditions, with funding available to the UNHCR, the International Federation of
the Red Cross and six international NGOs; all on top of €509 million under multiannual national programmes.
Of course, money alone will solve nothing without the administrative capability and structural capacity in
Greece to spend it effectively.
8. Conclusions and recommendations
44. Greece is bearing a grotesquely disproportionate responsibility for responding to the refugee and
migration crisis in the eastern Mediterranean and western Balkans, simply because of its place on the map.
Yet in every other respect it is perhaps the least well-placed of all EU countries to bear this responsibility, on
account of prolonged economic depression, budgetary austerity, and resulting administrative chaos and social
55. COM(2016)165 final and COM(2016)222 final.
56. “Implementing the EU–Turkey Agreement – Questions and Answers”, European Commission, 4 May 2016.
57. European Commission, “Third report on relocation and resettlement”, 18 May 2016, COM(2016)360 final.
58. COM(2016)165 final, COM(2016)222 final and COM(2016)360 final.
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unrest, which exacerbate long-standing failures of its asylum system. The European Union, supposedly based
on solidarity, co-operation and respect for human rights and the rule of law, has failed to provide adequate
support or to ensure that responsibility is shared more equitably amongst the other member States. And many
European States – both EU members and not – have acted out of cynical self-interest, adding to Greece’s
burden or failing to take action to alleviate it.
45. The first victims of this disgraceful state of affairs are the refugees who find themselves blocked in a
country that is unable to ensure even basic levels of protection, depriving thousands of people of their
fundamental human dignity – people who have already lost everything to conflict and persecution. On the
Aegean islands, refugees who have committed no crime are locked up in conditions worse than prison, in a
soul-destroying state of administrative limbo, not knowing what is happening to them or what will be their
future. Vulnerable persons, including children, are held alongside angry, frustrated young men, at risk of
violence, exploitation and abuse. On the mainland, substandard reception centres are filled to overflowing with
refugees waiting to be processed by an asylum system that struggles with even basic preliminary formalities.
Thousands of others, including many children, do not benefit from even the minimal structures and stability of
official sites, instead living in the appalling filth and confusion of informal camps. Children are imprisoned in
police cells for want of appropriate shelter. Despite the impressive generosity and commitment shown by
Greek volunteers and civil society organisations throughout the country, Greece has so far been unable to
provide for the refugees’ and migrants’ most basic needs.
46. There is little sign of these problems being solved. More than two months after “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia” closed its border, there are still 10 000 refugees and migrants at Eidomeni, agitated
by false rumours that the border will reopen and increasingly susceptible to the lure of migrant smugglers.
Two months after the EU–Turkey Agreement, the hotspots are still detaining thousands of people in
substandard conditions, thousands more are in inadequate reception facilities or without proper shelter, there
is still no fully operational asylum system on the islands, and there is uncertainty about the fate of the asylum
seekers who are confined there. And more than five years after the Court’s judgments in M.S.S. and Rahimi,
the Greek asylum system on the mainland is still unable to ensure reliable status determination procedures,
sufficient reception capacity, adequate detention conditions or basic protection for vulnerable persons
including children.
47. In the attached draft resolution, I therefore propose a series of recommendations to the Greek
authorities, to the European Union and its member States, and to States participating in the European Union’s
relocation scheme, intended to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of refugees and migrants, support
for the Greek authorities and society in their efforts to respond to the current challenges, and reinforce
solidarity between European countries in response to what must be accepted as being a European and not
only a Greek problem.
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